3 4 5 6 7	THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR., DISTRICT ATTORN County of Santa Barbara By: RONALD J. ZONEN (State Bar No. 85094) Senior Deputy District Attorney GORDON AUCHINCLOSS (State Bar No. 1502 Senior Deputy District Attorney GERALD McC. FRANKLIN (State Bar No. 401 Senior Deputy District Attorney 1112 Santa Barbara Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Telephone: (805) 568-2300 FAX: (805) 568-2398	SUPERIOR COURT of CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA 251)
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
4	FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA	
ы	SANTA MARIA DIVISION	
11	•	procession redacted version
12	THE PROPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,) No. 1133603
13 14 15	Plaintiff, v.	PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER ALLOWING USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT OF CHILD
16 17	MICHAEL JOE JACKSON,) ABUSE TRAUMA;) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS) AND AUTHORITIES)
18	Defendant.) DATE: January 12, 2005) TIME: 8:30 a.m. _) DEPT: SM 2 (Melville)
19 20		WALED WHORISHAM
21	TO: DEFENDANT MICHAEL JOE JACKSON, AND TO THOMAS	
23	MESEREAU, JR. ROBERT SANGER AND R. BRIA RECORD:	IN OXMAN, HIS COUNSEL OF
24	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 12, 2005, at 8:30 a.m. or as soon	
25	thereafter as the matter may be heard, the People will move the Court for its order authorizing	
26	Plaintiff to put before the trial jury expert testimony concerning "child sexual abuse	
27 j	accommodation syndrome" (CSAAS).	
28	The motion will be based on this Notice and the accompanying Memorandum of	
	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF E	EXPERT TESTIMONY RE: CHILD ABUSE TRAUMA

DATED: January 10, 2004

County of Santa Barbara

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Respectfully submitted,

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THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY


MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. INTRODUCTION:


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The People will seek to introduce expert testimony to explain the behavior of children who have been molested. The experts, and will testify that there are many misconceptions about how children react to having been molested, among them that children will immediately disclose the molestation to their closest relative, that children will disclose without hesitation all that occurred and that children who were molested will not have feelings of love or affection for those who molested them. will testify to the consequences of the "grooming process," the process by which children accept as normal the reality of their own molestation and how it affects their behavior thereafter.


B. STATEMENT OF FACTS:





PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY RE: CHILD ABUSE TRAUMA



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C. Argument

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EXPERT TESTIMONY ADDRESSING ISSUES OF "CHILD ABUSE TRAUMA" IS PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL DURING THE PEOPLE'S CASE-IN-CHIEF

As in cases involving Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence, "Child Abuse Trauma" and "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" experts are widely used to disabuse jurors of common myths and misconceptions in child sexual assault cases. Because the count-

A word about terminology: CALJIC 10.64 and the relevant decisional law refer to the "child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome," or "CSAAS." Some experts in the field limit application of the term CSAAS to discussions of victims of "intrafamilial" child sexual abuse i.e., sexual abuse of a child by a family member, a close relative or one who is treated as a member of child's immediate family. Those experts use the more encompassing term "Child Abuse Trauma" to describe the complex of symptoms demonstrated by a child sexually abused by a person in whom trust may have been reposed but whose connection to a victim's immediate family was not necessarily that of a live-in relative. The distinction apparently is without a legal difference: a number of the reported decisions have approved the admission of "CSAAS" evidence in cases where the defendant's relationship to the victim was merely a trusting acquaintanceship, if that. (See, e.g., People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d. 385 [victim a neighbor's child]; Seering v. Dept. Soc. Svcs. (1987) 194 Cal. App.3d 298 [day-care provider]; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.4th 1737 [near neighbor]; People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 [dating relationship with victim's mother]; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 439 [baby-sitter pervert]; People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal. App.4th 392 [boyfriend of victim's mother]; People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal. App. 3d 1136 [inter alia, boyfriend of victim's mother].)

approved guidelines and accompanying jury instructions would ensure that the jurors would properly apply any Child Abuse Trauma testimony, such testimony is admissible to dispel any misconceptions involved in the instant case.

Expert testimony is admissible at trial as long as the testimony will be of assistance to the trier of fact and is reliable. (Evid. Code, § 801; People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 390.) In California, the Kelly-Frye analysis is commonly used to determine the admissibility of new scientific methods of proof. (People v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 390, citing People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 24 and Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 1013.) In the early 1980's prosecutors began presenting evidence of "Rape Trauma Syndrome" to show that the fact that a victim suffered from the syndrome proved that she must have been raped. In 1984 the California Supreme Court held that "[u]nlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, voiceprints or the battered child syndrome, rape trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular past event - i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred -- but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool" (People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 249-250.) In part because it is an "umbrella concept" designed for a different purpose than the battered child syndrome, Rape Trauma Syndrome does not satisfy the Kelly-Frye requirements and is not admissible in trial to prove that a witness was raped. (Id. at pp. 250-251.) But the Supreme Court "hasten[ed] to add that nothing in this opinion is intended to imply that evidence of the emotional psychological trauma that a complaining witness suffers after an alleged rape is inadmissible in a rape prosecution." (Id., p. 251.) Though evidence of Rape Trauma Syndrome cannot be used to prove that a rape occurred, it may be used "to rebut misconceptions about the presumed behavior of rape victims." (People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 248; People v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 385 at p. 391, citing Bledsoe.)

Decisional law concerning admissibility of Child Sexual Assault Accommodation Syndrome evidence built on the decisions concerning the admission of Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence. Like Rape Trauma Syndrome, CSAAS was developed as a therapeutic tool. (People v. Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 390.) Because CSAAS evidence, like Rape Trauma

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Syndrome evidence, does not satisfy the *Kelly-Frye* standard, the law precludes an expert from testifying that, based on CSAAS, a particular victim's report is credible and he or she has in fact been molested. *Id.* But, as long as the CSAAS testimony is directed to dispel common myths or misconceptions surrounding a child's sexual assault, it is admissible. (*Id.* at 393-94; see also *People v. Patino* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737 [holding that the introduction of CSAAS testimony to disabuse a jury of "misconceptions it might hold about how a child reacts to a molestation" violates neither the confrontation clause nor a defendant's due process rights; *id.*, at p. 1744].)

Over the years the courts have developed guidelines to insure that child abuse trauma evidence is used appropriately. CSAAS testimony must be addressed to a specific myth or misconception presented by the evidence. (People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947. 955; People v. Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at 1745.) "Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior. The great majority of courts approve such expert rebuttal testimony." (Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation (1989) 68 Neb. L.Rev. 1, 89, cited and quoted in People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301.)

Identifying a myth or misconception does not require the prosecution to expressly state on the record the evidence that is inconsistent with molestation. (*People v. Patino, supra*, 26 Cal.App.4th at 1744.) "It is sufficient if the victim's credibility is placed in issue due to paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a molestation." (*Id.* at pp.1744-45.) CSAAS testimony may be introduced to show why the victim acted as she did and explain her state of mind. (*Id.* at p.1746.) Because it would be natural for a jury to wonder why a molestation was not immediately reported or why a victim returned to an assailant's home after an initial molest, the People may introduce CSAAS evidence during their case in chief, "if an issue has been raised as to the victim's credibility." (*Id.* at 1745.)

In People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d. 1289, the prosecution sought to introduce expert testimony to explain the behavior of the victim's mother in not disclosing knowledge

"Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior.


[¶] The great majority of courts approve such expert rebuttal testimony."

(Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation (1989) 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 89, fn. omitted)

(People v. McAlpin, supra at pp. 1300-1301.)

When child abuse trauma testimony is admitted, the court must sua sponte instruct the jury that "(1) such evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim's reactions, as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested; and (2) the expert's testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim's molestation claim is true." (People v. Housley, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 947, at p. 959)

Although CALIIC 10.64 provides an appropriate instruction, even when courts have failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding the proper use of CSAAS testimony, that error has been held harmless. (*Ibid.*)



An expert in Child Abuse Trauma will be able to explain how the grooming process allows a child to be victimized with his own cooperation. The compliant victim is the offender's creation. It is the result of considerable effort to gain the child's trust, cooperation, confidence and belief that the offender's behavior is normal, acceptable and even enjoyable.

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That process involved the use of gifts, pornography, alcoholic beverages, separation from his mother, and the creation of an entirely artificial environment filled with one indulgence and pleasure after another.

Although the People are not legally required to place the specific myths and misconceptions the CSAAS testimony would be designed to address on the record (*People v Patino*, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, at p. 1744), the factual scenario of this case leaves open a variety of opportunities for defense counsel to exploit juror's misconceptions to their advantage. Ranging from the myths that assailants are strangers to the notion that genuine victims must report immediately, consistently, and without any loss of memory, the jury must be educated as to the true mental states through which molest victims suffer.

CONCLUSION The instant case involves The instant case involves

testimony of an expert in Child Abuse Trauma is needed to assure that jurors are disabused of the kinds of myths commonly associated with this type of child victim behavior.

> DATED: January 10, 2004 Respectfully submitted,

> > THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY County of Santa Barbara

By: Ronald J. Zonen, Senior Deputy

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
) SS
COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA
)

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and I am not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is: District Attorney's Office; Courthouse; 1112 Santa Barbara Street. Santa Barbara. California 93101.

On January 10, 2005, I served the within REDACTED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FOR ORDER ALLOWING USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT OF CHILD ABUSE TRAUMA; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES on Defendant, by THOMAS A. MESEREAU, JR., ROBERT SANGER, and BRIAN OXMAN by personally delivering a true copy thereof to Mr. Sanger's office in Santa Barbara, by transmitting a facsimile copy thereof to Attorney Mesereau, and by causing a true copy thereof to be mailed to Mr. Mesereau, first class postage prepaid, at the addresses shown on the attached Service List.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Santa Barbara, California on this 10th day of January, 2005.

Gerald McC Franklin

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SERVICE LIST

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Co-counsel for Defendant